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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joel Evan Bordeaux appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to trafficking in marijuana. Specifically, he challenges the
denial of his motion to suppress.
Statement of Facts
The state adopts the statement of facts set forth by the district court in its
"Order Denying Motion To Suppress" (R., vol. I, pp.167-182), a copy of which is
attached as an appendix to this brief.

For this Court's convenience, the

statement of facts is reproduced below:
Defendant Joel E. Bordeaux is charged with Trafficking in
Marijuana . . . . The charges arise out of the stop of a vehicle in
which Mr. Bordeaux was a passenger. The vehicle in question, a
1985 red Honda with Washington plates, was observed initially at
Porthill, Idaho, a port of entry into the United States from Canada.
[PH Tr., p.2, Ls.16-21, p.3, Ls.11-25, p.7, Ls.5-11.]
At
approximately 7:00 a.m. on October 9, 2003, the vehicle was
routinely detained at the border by United States customs agents.
[PH Tr., p.4, L.25 - p.6, L.1 O.] At the time of the detention at the
border, two males were in the vehicle, the driver, Scott
Scheideman, and [a passenger,] Jeffrey Tate. [PH Tr., p.4, Ls.2-5,
p.6, Ls.11-14.] The first customs agent who conducted the
"primary interview" of the occupants of the vehicle was Inspector
Zimmerman. [PH Tr., p.5, Ls.1-6.] She initiated a "trunking" of the
vehicle, requiring the occupants to open the trunk of the vehicle for
inspection. [PH Tr., p.5, Ls.8-16; 8/12/04 Tr., p.28, Ls.1-2.]
Inspector Bruce Whittaker came to assist and during an inspection
of a gym bag in the trunk observed a pair of women's panties in the
bag. [PH Tr., p.5, L.18-p.6, L.1, p.14, Ls.1-14; 8/12/04 Tr., p.28,
Ls.3-8.] After he asked the two men a few questions, they were
allowed to proceed across the border into the United Sates. [PH
Tr., p.6, Ls.3-10.)
As they left, Inspector Whittaker radioed the United States
Border Patrol located in Bonners Ferry, Idaho, to advise them
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about the two subjects. [PH Tr., p.6, Ls.16-25; 8/12/04 Tr., p.26,
L.24 - p.27, L.2.] He gave the Border Patrol a description of the
vehicle and its license plate number. [PH Tr., p.7, Ls.1-4.] The
reason that Inspector Whittaker's suspicions were aroused was the
presence of women's clothing in the automobile which could
indicate that one of the men had a girlfriend or wife in Canada that
he intended to pick up after she eluded customs by walking across
the United States-Canadian border at an unregulated point. [PH
Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.15, L.21; 8/12/04 Tr., p.28, Ls.1-25, p.31, L.24 p.32, L.5.] Inspector Whittaker did not convey this information to
the Border Patrol, but he did request that the Patrol look for the
vehicle to see if it picked up an additional passenger. [PH Tr., p.6,
Ls.16-19, p.7, Ls.2-4, p.15, Ls.22-24; 8/12/04 Tr., p.27, Ls.19-23,
p.29, Ls.3-8, p.31, Ls.5-23.]
At about 7:10 a.m. on October 9, 2003, Peter Shepard, a
senior patrol agent with the Border Patrol, received a call from
Inspector Whittaker. [PH Tr., p.40, Ls.8-18; 8/12/04 Tr., p.37, L.14
- p.38, L.1.] About 15 or 20 minutes later, as he was headed north
on Highway 95 toward the border, Agent Shepard, saw the 1985
Honda go by with what appeared to be four occupants in the
vehicle, rather than two. [PH Tr., p.40, L.20 - p.41, L.2; 8/12/04
Tr., p.38, Ls.7-10, p.39, Ls.20-24, p.44, L.21 - p.45, L.9, p.47,
Ls.20-23; 10/5/05 Tr., p.7, L.2 - p.8, L.6.] He turned around and
stopped the vehicle about fifteen miles from the border to check the
"immigration status" of the occupants. [PH Tr., p.41, Ls.4-19;
8/12/04 Tr., p.19, Ls.3-11; p.38, Ls.11-20, p.39, L.18 - p.40, L.6,
p.42, Ls.5-24, p.50, Ls.13-15, p.51, Ls.8-11; 10/5/05 Tr., p.8, Ls.724.] Mr. Scheideman and Mr. Tate were seated in the front of the
vehicle. [PH Tr., p.41, Ls.20-23.] In the back seat were a dog and
a man. [PH Tr., p.41, L.24 - p.42, L.5.] The additional male
occupant was the defendant, Joel Bordeaux. [PH Tr., p.41, Ls.2425.] Agent Shepard testified that Mr. Bordeaux did not make eye
contact and kept his hands in his pockets. [PH Tr., p.42, Ls.24-25.]
The agent observed that all three men were behaving nervously,
but that Mr. Bordeaux's pale color and actions indicated he was
more nervous than the other two men. [PH Tr., p.57, L.19 - p.58,
L.23.] Agent Shepard asked the men to exit the car and patted
them down. [PH Tr., p.43, Ls.15-21; 10/5/05 Tr., p.11, L. 13 - p.12,
L.2, p.13, Ls.13-17.] He noticed that Mr. Bordeaux's hiking boots
were damp and that he had some dirt on them. [PH Tr., p.43,
Ls.21-22.]
When Agent Shepard asked for identification, Mr. Bordeaux
was able to produce only a business card with his picture on it from
a Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, real estate office. [PH Tr., p.43, L.23 -
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p.44, L.2, p.45, Ls.2-3; 10/5/05 Tr., p.10, L.13 - p.11, L.1, p.22,
L.22 - p.23, L.2.] Mr. Bordeaux was unable or unwilling to provide
a social security number to Agent Shepard. [10/5/05 Tr., p.27, L.18
- p.29, L.9.] When he asked the individuals where they were
going, Mr. Bordeaux said that he was going to work for a friend of
his in the logging business. [PH Tr., p.44, L.25 - p.45, L.2.] Mr.
Bordeaux stated that he lived in both Coeur d'Alene and Sandpoint,
Idaho. [PH Tr., p.54, Ls.3-7.] He said that he had been visiting his
girlfriend, but he did not give the border agent the girlfriend's name
or address. [PH Tr., p.42, Ls.11-22; 10/5/05 Tr., p.40, Ls.1-10.]
Agent Shepard asked Mr. Scheideman, who was the owner
of the vehicle, if the officers could run a dog trained in drug
detection around the car. [PH Tr., p.44, Ls.3-5, p.45, Ls.6-18, p.46,
Ls.16-18, p.54, L.24 - p.55, L.11; 10/5/05 Tr., p.25, L.23 - p.26,
L.3.] Mr. Scheideman answered that "he didn't see why not." [PH
Tr., p.45, Ls.6-18, p.46, Ls.16-18, p.55, Ls.10-17.] About ten
minutes after the car had been stopped, Agent Shepard radioed for
the drug dog, which was brought to the location five or ten minutes
later. [PH Tr., p.54, Ls.8-14, p.56, Ls.10-12; 10/5/05 Tr., p.15,
Ls.4-7, p.16, Ls.19-23.] Around 7:40 a.m. U.S. Border Patrol Agent
Eldon Hurst arrived at the scene, as well as Idaho State Police
Trooper Brad Zimmerman. [PH Tr., p.64, Ls.3-12, p.73, Ls.17-18,
p.74, Ls.18-23; 10/5/05 Tr., p.14, L.7 - p.15, L.7.]
Agent Hurst watched as the dog was run around the car by
Officer David Schuman of the Boundary County Sheriffs Office.
[PH Tr., p.21, L.12- p.22, L.8, p.66, L.13- p.67, L.21.] As Officer
Schuman neared a window of the vehicle, the drug dog attempted
to jump into the vehicle. [PH Tr., p.22, Ls.8-11.] The officer put the
canine into the vehicle and had her sniff the dash. [PH Tr., p.33,
L.25 - p.34, L.17.] The dog then immediately jumped into the back
seat, pushing with her head on the seat in an attempt to get into
the trunk. [PH Tr., p.27, Ls.1-4, p.34, Ls.3-17.] This action
indicated to [the officer] that there was some illegal substance in
the trunk. [PH Tr., p.27, Ls.5-8.] Officer Schuman then reported
his findings to the border patrol agent. [PH Tr., p.27, Ls.5-13, p.35,
Ls.9-12.]
After learning that Mr. Scheideman was the owner of the
car, Agent Hurst asked if he could look in the trunk of the vehicle.
Mr. Scheideman answered "yes." [PH Tr., p.68, Ls.4-6, p.69, Ls.39, p.78, Ls.10-12.] Mr. Bordeaux handed one of the agents a card
that stated that he did not waive his right to be free from a search
of his person, vehicle, or property. [8/12/04 Tr., p.21, L.21 - p.22,
L.5; 10/5/05 Tr., p.35, L.12 - p.36, L.17; Defendant's Exhibit C.]
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This was done either as Agent Hurst was beginning to open the
trunk or shortly thereafter. [10/5/05 Tr., p.35, L.12 - p.36, L.17.)
As soon as Agent Hurst opened the trunk, he smelled the
odor of marijuana. [PH Tr., p.69, L.22 - p.71, L.4; 8/12/04 Tr.,
p.18, Ls.8-19.] Inside the forward part of the trunk was a backpack
with an internal frame wrapped in a camouflage rain poncho. [PH
Tr., p.69, Ls.10-11, p.71, Ls.5-7; 8/12/04 Tr., p.18, Ls.14-15.]
Inside the backpack the agent discovered sealed bags containing a
green, leafy substance, which tests later showed was marijuana.
[PH Tr., p.71, Ls.9-11; 8/12/04 Tr., p.18, Ls.16-19.] Later it was
found that there were eleven sealed bags in all, each bag weighing
approximately 1.3 pounds. [PH Tr., p.81, L.7 - p.82, L.12.]
During the time that the men were detained and when the
search was conducted, Agent Shepard was speaking with dispatch
to gather the records of the individuals in the car. [10/5/05 Tr.,
p.27, Ls.11-17, p.33, L.7-p.34, L.17.] The records did not confirm
Mr. Bordeaux's identity because he did not provide a social security
number. [10/5/05 Tr., p.27, L.18 - p.28, L.3, p.43, L.9 - p.44,
L.19 .] The records being run were based on his name and
approximate age. [10/5/05 Tr., p.29, Ls.3-9.) It was not until Agent
Shepard went to the jail that he was able to establish Mr.
Bordeaux's identity. [10/5/05 Tr., p.28, L.7 - p.29, L.2.]
Because Mr. Bordeaux was connected with the backpack,
which had not been in the vehicle when it crossed the border, he
was bound over for Trafficking in Marijuana. [R., vol. I, pp.49-50.]
(R., vol. I, pp.167-170 (citations to the record supplied).)

Course of Proceedings
Bordeaux was charged with trafficking in five or more pounds of
marijuana. (R., vol. I, pp.49-50.) He filed a motion to suppress the evidence
against him, contending, inter a/ia, that it was the fruit of an unlawful detention.
(R., vol. I, pp.93-94.) After a hearing, the district court denied the motion. (R.,
vol. I, pp.167-182.) Bordeaux entered a conditional guilty plea to trafficking in
marijuana, preserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.
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(R., vol. I, pp.188-190, 192-196.) The district court accepted Bordeaux's plea
and imposed a unified sentence of eight years with three years fixed. (R., vol. II,
pp.241-244.)

After having his appellate rights reinstated in post-conviction

proceedings, Bordeaux timely appealed. (R., vol. II, pp.240-247.)
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ISSUE
Bordeaux states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Bordeaux's motion to
suppress?
(Appellant's brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court correctly apply the law to the facts in denying Bordeaux's
motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Denying
Bordeaux's Motion To Suppress

A

Introduction
The district court denied Bordeaux's suppression motion, ruling:

1) the

stop of the vehicle in which Bordeaux was riding as a passenger was supported
by reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contained illegal immigrants, and 2) the
length of the detention was reasonable to effectuate its purpose.
pp.172-174.)

(R., vol. I,

The court also ruled, in the alternative, that the encounter was

constitutionally permissible as an "extended border search." (R., vol. I, pp.176181.) Bordeaux challenges the district court's rulings on a variety of grounds,
none of which are supported by the applicable law or the district court's findings
of fact.

Bordeaux has failed to show error in the denial of his motion to

suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the
court] freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as
found." State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005).
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C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Stop Of The Vehicle In
Which Bordeaux Was Riding As A Passenger Was Supported By A
Reasonable And Articulable Suspicion That The Vehicle May Contain
Illegal Aliens
United States Border Patrol Agent Shepard stopped the vehicle in which

Bordeaux was riding as a passenger for the sole purpose of checking the
immigration status of its occupants.

(PH Tr., p.41, Ls.4-19; 8/12/04 Tr., p.19,

Ls.3-11; p.38, Ls.11-20, p.39, L.18 - p.40, L.6, p.42, Ls.5-24, p.50, Ls.13-15,
p.51, Ls.8-11; 10/5/05 Tr., p.8, Ls.7-24.) The district court ruled that the stop
was constitutionally permissible based on Agent Shepard's reasonable suspicion
that Bordeaux may have illegally crossed the United States-Canadian border.
(R., vol. I, pp.172-73.) Contrary to Bordeaux's assertions on appeal, a review of

the applicable law and the facts of this case support the district court's
determination.
When a roving border patrol agent makes observations that "lead him
reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are
illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the
circumstances that provoke suspicion." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 881 (1975). See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
555-56 (1976). "[A] roving-patrol stop need not be justified by probable cause."
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 555-56 (citing Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884).
Rather, such stops may be undertaken upon reasonable suspicion of an illegal
border crossing.

lsL

For purposes of a roving border patrol stop, the "reasonable suspicion"
standard requires that the officer be "aware of specific articulable facts, together
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with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that
the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country." Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. at 884. As with stops undertaken pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), whether the officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct a
roving border patrol stop is determined on the basis of the totality of the
circumstances. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1981); BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. at 884-85. Factors to be considered by the officer include, but
are not limited to, "the characteristics of the area in which [the officer]
encounter[s] a vehicle," "[i]ts proximity to the border," and whether the vehicle
has "an extraordinary number of passengers." )s;l (citations omitted).

"In all

situations the officer is entitled to assess the facts in light of his experience in
detecting illegal entry and smuggling." )s;l at 885 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
Application of the above legal principles to the facts of this case supports
the district court's determination that the stop of the vehicle in which Bordeaux
was riding as a passenger was justified by reasonable suspicion that the vehicle
may contain illegal aliens. The vehicle arrived at the United States-Canadian
border checkpoint at Porthill at approximately 7:00 a.m. (PH Tr., p.2, Ls.16-21,
p.3, Ls.11-25, p.4, L.2 - p.6, L.14, p.7, Ls.5-11.) At that time there were only two
people in the vehicle. (PH Tr., p.4, Ls.2-5, p.6, Ls.11-14.) Customs inspectors
at the port of entry questioned the occupants of the vehicle, inspected their
identification and performed a cursory search of the vehicle's trunk. (PH Tr., p.5,
L.1 - p.6, L.10; 8/12/04 Tr., p.28, Ls.1-8.)

While searching the trunk, the

inspectors found an athletic bag containing a pair of women's underwear. (PH
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Tr., p.5, L.18 - p.6, L.1, p.14, Ls.1-14; 8/12/04 Tr., p.28, Ls.3-8.) This finding
aroused Inspector Bruce Whittaker's suspicion because he knew from past
experience that individuals "will go up to visit a girlfriend or even get married [in
Canada] and sometimes they will try to bring them around the border and take
them south into the United States."

(PH Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.15, L.21.)

The

inspectors permitted the vehicle and its occupants to cross the border and travel
south into the United Sates.

(PH Tr., p.6, Ls.3-10.)

However, Inspector

Whittaker radioed ahead to border patrol to be on the lookout for the vehicle to
see if it had picked up an additional passenger. (PH Tr., p.6, Ls.16-25, p.7, Ls.24, p.15, Ls.22-24; 8/12/04 Tr., p.27, Ls.19-23, p.29, Ls.3-8, p.31, Ls.5-23.)
United States Border Patrol Agent Shepard received the call from
Inspector Whittaker at approximately 7:10 a.m. (PH Tr., p.40, Ls.8-18; 8/12/04
Tr., p.37, L.14 - p.38, L. 1.)

Fifteen to twenty minutes later, Agent Shepard

observed a vehicle matching the description of the one given to him by Inspector
Whittaker fifteen miles south of United States-Canadian border. (PH Tr., p.40,
L.20 - p.41, L.2; 8/12/04 Tr., p.38, Ls.7-10, p.39, Ls.20-24, p.44, L.21 - p.45,
L.9, p.47, Ls.20-23; 10/5/05 Tr., p.7, L.2 - p.8, L.6.) The vehicle was traveling
south on Highway 95 and now contained at least one additional passenger. (PH
Tr., p.40, L.20 - p.41, L.2; 8/12/04 Tr., p.38, Ls.7-10, p.42, Ls.18-22, p.46,
Ls.17-21, p.47, L.15-p.48, L.7, p.50, Ls.1-12.)
Viewed in their totality, the above facts supplied Agent Shepard with the
reasonable suspicion necessary to stop the vehicle to check the immigration
status of its occupants.

Although the vehicle was never under surveillance
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between the time it crossed the border and the time of the stop, the spatial and
temporal proximity of the vehicle to the border and the addition of one or more
passengers gave rise to reasonable suspicion, if not a reasonable certainty, that
the additional passenger(s) had crossed the border illegally.

See, .!t.fh, United

th

States v. Corral-Villavicencio, 753 F.2d 785, 788-89 (9 Cir. 1985) (noting in the
context of extended border search cases that the presence of additional
passengers is a salient fact in the totality of the circumstances and gives rise to
reasonable certainty of illegal entry); United States v. Markham, 440 F.2d 1119
(9

th

th

Cir. 1991); United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320 (9 Cir. 1970) (fact that car

crossed border with one occupant and was seen shortly thereafter and in close
proximity to border with two occupants gave rise to reasonable certainty that
passenger had crossed the border illegally).
Bordeaux argues that the facts of this case did not supply Agent Shepard
with the reasonable suspicion required for the stop for two reasons.

First, he

argues that Agent Shepard "did not verify the red Honda he was stopping was
the same red Honda that had crossed the border earlier that morning using the
license plate number that was provided to him by Officer Whittaker." (Appellant's
brief, p.12.) This argument is without merit as it ignores both Agent Shepard's
testimony and the district court's findings of fact. Agent Shepard testified that
Inspector Whittaker provided him with a description of the vehicle and a license
plate number. (PH Tr., p.40, Ls.8-18.) He further testified that he subsequently
"observed the vehicle going south" on Highway 95.

(PH Tr., p.40, Ls.20-21.)

Although Agent Shepard did not specifically testify that he compared the license
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plate number of the vehicle with the one provided to him by Inspector Whittaker,
the district court could and did reasonably infer from Agent Shepard's testimony
that the vehicle he stopped was the same vehicle Inspector Whittaker had
identified.
Bordeaux next contends that the fact "there was a third person in the
vehicle is not sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that there was now an
illegal immigrant in the vehicle given the time (20 minutes) and the distance
(approximately fifteen miles) the vehicle had traveled while not under
surveillance." (Appellant's brief, p.12.) In support of his argument, Bordeaux
points out that evidence was presented at the suppression hearing which
showed that there were homes and businesses in the general area between the
border and the location of the stop. (Appellant's brief, pp.12 (citing 8/12/04 Tr.,
p.5, L.11 - p.9, L.15; PH Tr., p.62, Ls.3-15; Defense Exhibits A & B).) Bordeaux
apparently asks this Court to find that Agent Shepard did not have reasonable
suspicion to stop the vehicle to conduct an immigration status check because the
occupants of the Honda may have picked Bordeaux up at one of these homes or
businesses. Aside from ignoring Agent Shepard's testimony that it would have
been difficult in fifteen or twenty minutes for the Honda to have taken a route
other than one straight from the border to the point of the stop (8/12/04 Tr., p.43,
L.8 - p.44, L.2), Bordeaux's argument also ignores the applicable legal standard.
The fact that there may have been an innocent explanation for Bordeaux's
appearance in the vehicle does not negate the officer's reasonable suspicion,
based upon the proximity and timing, that Bordeaux may have illegally crossed
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the border. See State v. Rader, 135 Idaho 273, 276, 16 P.3d 949, 952 (Ct. App.
2000) ("[T]he existence of alternative innocent explanations of the circumstances
does not negate the fact that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that a crime
might have been committed.").
Viewed objectively, the totality of the facts known to Agent Shepard at the
time he stopped the vehicle in which Bordeaux was riding as a passenger
provided the officer with a reasonable and articulable basis to believe that the
vehicle contained illegal immigrants. The district court correctly applied the law
to the facts in concluding that the detention was constitutionally reasonable.

D.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Length Of The Detention
Was Reasonable To Effectuate The Purpose Of The Stop
As with any investigative stop, the stop and inquiry made pursuant to a

roving border patrol stop "must be 'reasonably related in scope to the justification
for their initiation."' United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)). "The officer may question the
driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigration status, and he
may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or
search must be based on consent or probable cause." Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S.
at 881-82. Contrary to Bordeaux's assertions on appeal, a review of the record
in this case supports the district court's determination that the length of the
detention was reasonable to effectuate the purpose of the stop.
Agent Shepard stopped the vehicle in which Bordeaux was riding as a
passenger to check the occupants' immigration status.
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Bordeaux told Agent

Shepard he was a United States citizen but, when asked, he did not provide the
officer with any government issued identification. (PH Tr., p.41, Ls.16-25, p.43,
L.23 - p.44, L.1.) Instead, he handed the officer a business card from a real
estate office in Coeur d'Alene. (PH Tr., p.43, L.24 - p.44, L.2, p.45, Ls.2-3;
10/5/05 Tr., p.10, L.13 - p.11, L.1, p.22, L.22 - p.23, L.2.) The business card
had Bordeaux's name and picture on it, but it did not contain any other
identifying information. (PH Tr., p.45, Ls.2-3.) Agent Shepard asked Bordeaux
for his social security number, but he was either unwilling or unable to provide it.
(10/5//05 Tr., p.27, Ls.27, L.14 - p.28, L.3.) After calling for backup, Agent
Shepard spent the remainder of the duration of the stop attempting to verify the
immigration status of Bordeaux and the other occupants of the vehicle. (10/5/05
Tr., p.27, Ls.11-17, p.33, L.7 - p.34, L.17.)

Agent Shepard never received

information verifying Bordeaux's identity or immigration status until Bordeaux
was booked into jail. (10/5/05 Tr., p.28, L.7 - p.29, L.2.)
In light of the above facts, the district court correctly concluded that the
length of the detention was reasonable to effectuate its purpose, that being to
determine Bordeaux's immigration status. Although Bordeaux claimed to be a
United States citizen, the officer was not required to accept this unverified
representation as proof of Bordeaux's citizenship. Because Bordeaux failed to
provide the officer with any information from which the officer could verify
Bordeaux's identity and immigration status, the continuation of the detention for
the purpose of attempting to gather that information from other sources was
reasonably related to the purpose of the stop and did not violate Bordeaux's

14

Fourth Amendment rights.

Bordeaux's arguments to the contrary are without

merit.

E.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Upholding
The Constitutionality Of The Encounter On The Alternative Basis That It
Was An "Extended Border Search"
In addition to upholding the constitutionality of the stop for the purpose of

conducting an immigration status check, the district court also upheld the stop
and search of the vehicle on the alternative basis that it was an "extended border
search." (R., vol. I, pp.176-181.) The state adopts the district court's analysis on
this issue, as set forth beginning at page 10 of the court's "Order Denying Motion
To Suppress."

15

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon Bordeaux's conditional guilty plea to trafficking in marijuana.
DATED this 16th day of September 2008.

IA. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney Gener
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Appendix

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

)

Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-2003-674
Consolidated with CR-2003-675 and
Case No. CR-2003-676

)

)
)
)
)
)

VS.

•

JOEL E. BORDEAUX,
Defendant.

ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence on grounds of lack of probable cause
to stop the vehicle after it crossed the border and lack of probable cause to search
the trunk and its contents is DENIED.

I.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Joel E. Bordeaux is charged with Trafficking in Marijuana, a felony, in
violation of I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(l)(B). The charges arise out of the stop of a vehicle in which

Mr. Bordeaux was a passenger. The vehicle in question, a 1985 red Honda with Washington
plates, was observed initially at Porthil!, Idaho, a port of entry into the United States from
Canada. At approximately 7:00 a.m. on October 9, 2003, the vehicle was routinely detained at
the border by United States customs agents. At the time of detention at the border, two males
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were in the vehicle, the driver, Scott Scheideman, and Jeffrey Tate. The first customs agent who
conducted the "primary interview" of the occupants of the vehicle was Inspector Zimmerman.
She initiated a "trunking" of the vehicle, requiring the occupants to open the trunk of the vehicle
for inspection. Inspector Bruce Whittaker came to assist and during an inspection of a gym bag
in the trunk observed a pair of women's panties in the bag. After he asked the two men a few
questions, they were allowed to proceed across the border into the United States.
As they left, Inspector Whittaker radioed the United States Border Patrol located in
Bonners Ferry, Idaho, to advise them about the two subjects.

He gave the Border Patrol a

description of the vehicle and its license plate number. The reason that Inspector Whittaker's
suspicions were aroused was the presence of women's clothing in the automobile which could
•

indicate that one of the men had a girlfriend or wife in Canada that he intended to pick up after
she eluded customs by walking across the United States-Canadian border at an umegulated point.
Inspector Whittaker did not convey this information to the Border Patrol, but he did request that
the Patrol look for the vehicle to see if it picked up an additional passenger.
At about 7:10 a.m. on October 9, 2003, Peter Shepard, a senior patrol agent with the
Border Patrol, received a call from Inspector Whittaker. About 15 or 20 minutes later, as he was
headed north on Highway 95 toward the border, Agent Shepard saw the 1985 Honda go by with
what appeared to be four occupants in the vehicle, rather than two. He turned around and
stopped the vehicle about fifteen miles from the border to check the "irmnigration status" of the
occupants. Mr. Scheideman and Mr. Tate were seated in the front of the vehicle. In the back
seat were a dog and a man. The additional male occupant was the defendant, Joel Bordeaux:.
Agent Shepard testified that Mr. Bordeaux did not make eye contact and kept his hands in his
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pockets.

The agent observed that all three men were behaving nervously, but that Mr.

Bordeaux's pale color and actions indicated that he was more nervous than the other two men.
Agent Shepard asked the men to exit the car and patted them down.

He noticed that Mr.

Bordeaux's hiking boots were damp and that he had some dirt on them.
When Agent Shepard asked for identification, Mr. Bordeaux was able to produce only a
business card with his picture on it from a Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, real estate office.

Mr.

Bordeaux was unable or unwilling to provide a social security number to Agent Shepard. When
he asked the individuals where they were going, Mr. Bordeaux said that he was going to work
for a friend of his in the logging business. Mr. Bordeaux stated that he lived in both Coeur
d'Alene and Sandpoint, Idaho. He said that he had been visiting his girlfriend, but he did not

•

give the border agent the girlfriend's name or address .
Agent Shepard asked Mr. Scheideman, who was the owner of the vehicle, if the officers
could run a dog trained in drug detection around the car. Mr. Scheideman answered that "he
didn't see why not." About ten minutes after the car had been stopped, Agent Shepard radioed
for the drug dog, which was brought to the location five or ten minutes later. Around 7 :40 a.m.
U.S. Border Patrol Agent Eldon Hurst arrived at the scene, as well as Idaho State Police Trooper
Brad Zimmerman.
Agent Hurst watched as the dog was run around the car by Officer David Schuman of the
Boundary County Sheriff's Office. As Officer Schuman neared a window of the vehicle, the
drug dog attempted to jump into the vehicle. The officer put the canine into the vehicle and had
her sniff the dash. The dog then immediately jumped into the back seat, pushing with her head
on the seat in an attempt to get into the trunk. This action indicated to him that there was some
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illegal substance in the trunk. Officer Schuman then reported his findings to the border patrol
agent.
After learning that Mr. Scheideman was the owner of the car, Agent Hurst asked if he
could look in the trunk of the vehicle. Mr. Scheideman answered "yes." Mr. Bordeaux handed
one of the agents a card that stated that he did not waive his right to be free from a search of his
person, vehicle, or property. This was done either as Agent Hurst was beginning to open the

trunk or shortly thereafter.
As soon as Agent Hurst opened the trunk, he smelled the odor of marijuana. Inside the
forward part of the trunk was a backpack with an internal frame wrapped in a camouflage rain
poncho.

Inside the backpack the agent discovered sealed bags containing a green, leafy

substance, which tests later showed was marijuana. Later it was found that there were eleven
sealed bags in all, each bag weighing approximately 1.3 pounds.
During the time that the men were detained and when the search was conducted, Agent
Shepard was speaking with dispatch to gather the records of the individuals in the car. The
records did not confirm Mr. Bordeaux's identity because he did not provide a social security
number. The records being run were based on his name and approximate age. It was not until
Agent Shepard went to the jail that he was able to establish Mr. Bordeaux's identity.
Because Mr. Bordeaux was connected with the backpack, which had not been in the
vehicle when it crossed the border, he was bound over for Trafficking in Marijuana.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a decision on a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's
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findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application
of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d
1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibilily of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the
trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993,997 (1995).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432, 434, 925 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Ct. App. 1996). The
reasonableness standard imposed by the Fourth Amendment requires that the nature of the
intrusion upon the individual's privacy interest be balanced against the public need and
governmental interest promoted by the action taken. State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 517, 519, 826
P.2d 478,480 (Ct.App.1991), affirmed, 121 Idaho 491, 826 P.2d 452 (1992). The State bears the
burden of showing reasonableness, which the court evaluates within the totality of the
circumstances.

State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 847, 851, 41 P.3d 275, 279

(Ct.App.2001); Sailas, 129 Idaho at 434, 925 P.2d at 1133. A search without a warrant is per se
unreasonable, and the State has the burden to show that the search was pursuant to one of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 214, 677 P.2d 522, 527
(Ct. App. 1984).
In this case, the stop and search were conducted by a federal Border Patrol Agent;
therefore, the court applies relevant federal law concerning such searches.

II. ANALYSIS
Defendant has raised three issues with regard to the seizure of his person and the search
of the automobile in which he was riding: (1) whether there was an adequate justification for the
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initial stop of the vehicle; (2) whether the subsequent detention and search of the vehicle was
justified; and (3) whether the driver of the car consented to the search of the vehicle and the
search of the trunk.

A. Passenger Standing
The court first notes that an automobile passenger has no expectation of privacy in a
vehicle which he or she does not own.

A passenger, however, has standing to challenge the

reasonableness of an investigatory stop of the vehicle. State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho 405, 679
P.2d 1123 (1984). In addition, a passenger may challenge a search if the search is a product of
an initially lawful detention of the passenger that has become unreasonably protracted. State v.

Luna, 126 Idaho 235, 237, 880 P.2d 265, 267 (Ct.App.1994). In Luna the evidence was gained

•

as the result of an investigative stop which became unreasonable when the officer continued to
detain the driver and passengers after the suspicion that justified the stop had been dispelled.
If the detention of the passenger is not unreasonable, however, he has no standing to
contest the search, even if it is illegal. In addition, a passenger normally has no expectation of
privacy in the area under the seat of the vehicle or its trunk. Rakas v. lllinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99
S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); State v. Ryan, 117 Idaho 504, 506, 788 P.2d 1327, 1329
(1990). If the defendant demonstrates a privacy interest in items belonging to him that are in the
vehicle, he may have standing to object to the search of these items. State v. Zaitseva, 135 Idaho
11, 13 P.3d 338 (2000).
1. Stop

A traffic stop of a vehicle is a seizure of its occupants and therefore is subject to the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse,
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440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667-68 (1979); State v. Johnson,
137 Idaho 656, 51 P.3d 1112 (2002). Thus, a traffic stop and the ensuing investigation must be
justified by reasonable suspicion of a traffic offense or other criminal activity. Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491,498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229,236 (1983); United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2581, 45 L.Ed.2d 607,618 (1975).

. In this case, fifteen to twenty minutes after the vehicle had crossed the border at Porthill,
the border patrol agent observed a vehicle matching the description given to him by the customs
inspector, who had requested the agent to check for the vehicle to see if it contained additional
passengers. The vehicle was traveling south from the border with an additional passenger or
passengers in the vehicle, only minutes after Agent Shepard had received the information. These
are "articulable" facts forming the basis for a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity connected
with the passenger having crossed the border illegally. Therefore, the stop was justified.
2. Detention
Ordinarily, a stop must last no longer than necessary to effectuate its purpose, and the
investigative inquiry must be reasonably related in scope to the justification for the stop.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881, 95 S.Ct. at 2581, 45 L.Ed.2d at 618; State v. Myers, 118 Idaho

608, 612, 798 P.2d 453, 457 (Ct. App. 1990).

There is no "bright line" time limit for

determining the reasonableness of the stop. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct.
1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). The appropriate inquiry is "whether the officers diligently pursued
a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during
which time it was necessary to detain the defendant." Id, 470 U.S. at 686, 105 S.Ct. at 1575;
State v. Pabillore, 133 Idaho 650,991 P.2d 375 (Ct. App. 1999).
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Here the facts showed that Mr. Bordeaux was being detained to check his "immigration
statns" because he did not have proper identification and did not even provide a social security
number. The agents could not assume that he was an American citizen simply because he had a
business card with his picture on it. There is no indication that Mr. Bordeaux's citizenship status
was established prior to the discovery of the contraband, although Agent Shepard was attempting
to get this information through dispatch during the duration of the stop and investigation. Mr.
Bordeaux's identity was not established until he was taken to the jail.
The detention also involved an investigation into criminal activity to determine whether
Mr. Bordeaux had crossed the border illegally and whether he had illegal drugs with him. Once
the vehicle was stopped, reasonable suspicion ripened into probable cause that Mr. Bordeaux had
•

crossed the border illegally when he had inadequate identification and gave an inaccurate
explanation of where he had been prior to the stop.

In addition, the car was stopped within a

relatively short distance from the border and within a short time after it was known to have
crossed the border. These circumstances fit a common practice of drug smugglers to have one
person drive through a port of entry without contraband, while another person walks across the
border, undetected, with contraband and is later picked up by the driver. See, e.g., United States

v. Pratt, 104 Fed.Appx. 135 (9 th Cir. 2004)(Unpublished).
The continued detention of Mr. Bordeaux was reasonable, especially when Agent
Shepard had not established who he was due to lack of proper identification. Because he was no
unlawfully stopped, seized, or detained, Mr. Bordeaux had no standing to object to the search of
the vehicle and to the search of the trunk of the vehicle.
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B. Consent

A search pursuant to consent voluntarily given is an exception to the warrant
requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2045, 36 L.Ed.2d
854,859 (1973); State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 261,264,858 P.2d 800,803 (Ct. App. 1993). The
voluntariness of consent is evaluated in light of all the circumstances. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
227, 93 S.Ct. at 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d at 862; State v. Huskey, 106 Idaho 91, 94, 675 P.2d 351,354
(Ct. App. 1984). It is the State's burden to prove that consent was voluntarily given rather than
the result of duress or coercion, direct or implied. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222, 93 S.Ct. at
2045, 36 L.Ed.2d at 859; Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791,
20 L.Ed.2d 797, 802 (1968). Consent may be expressed through words, gestures, or other
•

conduct. State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). In this case,

Mr. Scheideman, the owner of the vehicle, verbally gave his express consent to open the trunk of
his vehicle. Mr. Bordeaux, who was being legally detained at that time, had no standing to
object to the search of the trunk.
Once Agent Hurst opened the trunk, he smelled a strong odor of marijuana, particularly
when the backpack was uncovered. There is no indication that Mr. Bordeaux claimed at that
point that the backpack belonged to him. Even if at the time of the search Mr. Bordeaux claimed
a privacy interest in the backpack and/or denied consent to search the backpack, the border agent
at that point possessed probable cause to search the backpack. Therefore, the motion to suppress
is denied.
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B. Automobile Exception

In the alternative, the court would hold that the search was justified pursuant to the
automobile exception. The automobile exception is based both upon the ready mobility of an
automobile, which is deemed an exigency sufficient to excuse the warrant requirement once
probable cause for the search is clear, and upon the lesser expectation of privacy in an
automobile as compared to the privacy interest in a home. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,
390-92, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2068-70, 85 L.Ed.2d 406, 412-14 (1985); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153, 45 S.Ct. 280,285, 69 L.Ed. 543,551 (1925); State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793,800,
964 P.2d 660,667 (1998). If probable cause justifies the search ofa vehicle, then it justifies the
search of every part of the vehicle, including the trunk and its contents, which could conceal the
object of the search. State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 821 P.2d 949 (1991).
In addition to the facts that Mr. Bordeaux was, not in the vehicle when it crossed the
border, the relatively short time that elapsed after the vehicle crossed the border, the proximity of
the vehicle to the Canadian border, the lack of identification, and an inaccurate account of where
he had been, the agent also observed that Mr. Bordeaux was nervous, kept his head down, and
would not make eye contact. Considering the totality of the circumstances known to the border
patrol agents and the other officers, there was probable cause to believe that contraband was
contained in the vehicle. The court concludes that the search of the trunk and its contents was
justified under the automobile exception.
C. Border Search Exception

Alternatively, the court holds that the search was valid under the "extended border
search" exception. When entering this country, a car and its passengers are subject to a customs
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search without probable cause. United States v. Perez, 644 F.2d 1299, 1302 (9

th

Cir. 1981).

Pursuant to this border search exception, "'routine searches of persons and their effects entering
the country may be conducted without any suspicion whatsoever."' United States v. Sutter, 340
th

F.3d 1022 (9 th Cir. 2003), quoting United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709, 712 (9 Cir.
2002).
Defendant relies on Alexander v. United States, 362 F .2d 379 (9 th Cir. 1966), which
governs searches of persons or things known to have recently crossed the border, although the
search does not occur at the border. See, Wayne R. Lafave, 4 SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
10.S(f) (1996). InAlexander, it was explained:

•

Where, however, a search for contraband by Customs officers is not made at
or in the immediate vicinity of the point of international border crossing, the
legality of the search must be tested by a determination whether the totality of the
surrounding circumstances, including the time and distance elapsed as well as the
manner and extent of surveillance, are such as to convince the fact finder with
reasonable certainty that any contraband which might be found in or on the
vehicle at the time of search was aboard the vehicle at the time of entry into the
jurisdiction of the United States. Any search by Customs officials which meets
this test is properly called a 'border search.'
Alexander, 362 F.2d at 382 (citations omitted). In these cases, there need be only a "mere" or

"unsupported" suspicion that a violation of the customs laws has occurred, but there must be a
"reasonable certainty" that any contraband found was in the vehicle at the time of initial entry
into the United States. Lafave, supra, § 10.S(f), p. 564. In making a judgment on the second
issue, the court must consider (1) the time which has elapsed since the entry; (2) the distance
from the point of entry; and (3) the extent and nature of the intervening surveillance. Id.
Another line of cases governs searches near the border of persons or things not known to
have crossed the border, which is more applicable to the facts in this case. See, Lafave, supra, §
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10.S(g). The leading case is U.S. v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320 (9 Cir. 1970), in which the Ninth
Circuit addressed the situation where there is an evasion of inspection at the border crossing or
where there is a question of whether the car has picked up suspect goods or persons. See United
States v. Kessler, 497 F.2d 277, 279 (9 th Cir. 1974). In Weil the court stated: "if the agents are

reasonably certain that a person has crossed the border iJlegally, and has then entered a vehicle
on this side of the border, we think that they may stop and search the vehicle and person. They
can assume that he may have brought something with him." Weil, 432 F.2d at 1323. If the Weil
standard is met, even though the search is conducted away from the border, it is considered to be
the equivalent of a border search. United States v. Corral-Villavicencio, 753 F.2d 785, 788 (9th
Cir. 1984). In a border search, the trunk of the vehicle may be searched as well as the passenger
compartment. See, e.g., Weil, 432 F.2d at 1322.
"Reasonable certainty" is a higher standard than that of probable cause. Kessler, 497
F.2d at 279. It does not require knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does require that
the totality of facts within the officers' knowledge of which they have reasonable trustworthy
information be sufficient in light of their experience "to warrant a firm belief that a border
crossing has occurred." United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363, 1366-1367 (9th Cir. 1976).
Defendant claims that Perez, supra, is applicable.

1n that case it was held that the

extended border search exceptions of Alexander and Weil did not apply because the customs
agent did not see the vehicle until it was three miles north of the Mexican border in the middle of
a busy border town. There were additional factors that weighed against a finding of "reasonable
certainty" in Perez-the fact that it could not be established that the vehicle had recently crossed
the border or that it contained drugs which had crossed the border. Perez, 644 F.2d at 1302.
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In this case it was established that the vehicle was detained approximately twenty
minutes or so after the vehicle had crossed the border at Porthill. Thus, it had recently crossed
the border. In addition, an additional passenger was in the vehicle, indicating that the passenger
could have walked across the border to avoid detection. The border patrol agent had been
notified by the customs inspector to watch for the vehicle to see if an additional passenger was in
the car. According to Weil, it can be assumed that a person who crosses the border illegally has
brought something with him. Therefore, this case is distinguishable from Perez.
Defendant also relies on United States v. Petersen, 473 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1973). There a
vehicle was observed crossing the border and was followed for a period of time. It was later
discovered in that it had three passengers. Marijuana was discovered in the trunk of the car. The
•

Ninth Circuit held that the search could not be justified as a border search under Weil because the
vehicle was not apprehended in a desolate area, but within the city limits of Naco, which was
accessible to a highway.

The court stated that the fact that the car contained additional

passengers did not satisfy the requirements of Weil because it did not mean they had crossed the
border illegally. In fact, they had been seen crossing the border legally the day before. Peterson,
473 F.2d at 875-76.
This case is distinguishable for at least three reasons. The car in Peterson had not been
stopped at the border and thus it was not known whether contraband was in the vehicle at the
time it crossed the border. In this case, it was known that there was no contraband in the vehicle
at the time it crossed the border. In Peterson the additional passengers picked up by the driver
were known to the customs agents involved and were known to have legally crossed the border
the day before. In this case, the identity and nationality of Mr. Bordeaux was not known and he
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had no proper identification. In addition, unlike Peterson, the customs inspector developed an
articulable suspicion that the driver might attempt to pick up a person who walked across the
border and he requested that the border patrol locate the vehicle to see if it contained an
additional passenger or passengers.
In Weil the factors considered in the "reasonable certainty" analysis were (I) suspicious

circumstances when the lone driver came across the border at the checkpoint; (2) the short
amount of time, about 40 minutes, between the time the vehicle crossed the border and was first
observed by a customs agent; (3) the fact that the road on which the vehicle was discovered ran
near the border; (4) the fact that an additional person was in the vehicle; and (5) the fact that two
suitcases were in the trunk of the vehicle which were not there when it crossed the border.
In this case, the facts establish that (1) the customs inspector at the border observed

suspicious circumstances at the border concerning women's clothing in the car which led him
advise the border patrol to look for the vehicle to see whether it contained an additional
occupant, possibly an illegal immigrant; (2) the vehicle was located approximately 20 minutes
later by a border patrol agent within 15 or 20 miles of the border; (3) the vehicle appeared to
have two additional p3.;3sengers, although one turned out to be a dog; (4) after the stop, the
additional passenger, Mr. Bordeaux, did not have a driver's license or adequate identification; (5)
Mr. Bordeaux did not provide a social security number; (5) Mr. Bordeaux's boots were damp
and muddy and he appeared very nervous; (6) Mr. Bordeaux did not provide a full explanation of
where he had been; (7) the explanation given was not accurate; (8) the trunk of the vehicle had
the strong odor of marijuana; and (9) the trunk contained a backpack with an internal frame. The
agents learned that the backpack was not in the vehicle when it crossed the border at Porthill,
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thereby helping to establish that the backpack belonged to Mr. Bordeaux. These facts are similar
to those in Weil.
Based on the totality of the surrounding circumstances and based in part on the credibility
'

of the witnesses at the time of hearing, the court concludes that there was a "reasonable
certainty" that Mr. Bordeaux had crossed the border illegally with contraband, and then entered
the vehicle on this side of the border. As such, the stop and search of the vehicle fall within an
"extended border search" under Weil.
Because the court finds(!) that Mr. Bordeaux lacked standing to object to the search of
the trunk of the vehicle; (2) that the owner of the vehicle gave consent to the search of the trunk;
(3) that the officer had probable cause to search the backpack; (4) that the search was permissible
under the automobile exception; and/or (5) that the search was valid as an extended border
search under Weil, the court need not address whether the drug dog was properly trained.

IV. ORDER
For the reasons stated above, the motion to suppress is denied.
DATED this

2D

v

day of December, 2004.

~wSteve Yerby
District::
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